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地方政府中的竞争性招标:理论与证据综述

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地方政府中的竞争性招标:理论与证据综述

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今天为大家带来的是George A. Boyne的研究：《地方政府中的竞争性招标：理论与证据综述》。

摘要

英国地方政府引入强制性竞争性招标，反映了传统的官僚制公共选择理论。这些理论认为，服务合同的竞争将降低支出并提高效率。对经典公共选择模型的扩展与批评却得出了截然不同的结论：第一，官僚制供给的问题并不像最初设想的那样严重；第二，竞争本身可能产生交易成本、侵蚀委托人与代理人之间的信任，并诱发寻租等新问题。因此，竞争对支出和效率的影响并不确定，必须通过经验研究加以检验。然而，评估地方政府竞争性招标效果的研究数量很少，所涵盖的服务范围有限，而且存在方法论缺陷。因此，无论是保守党最初强制推行竞争性招标，还是工党计划废除这一制度，都缺乏坚实的理论或经验证据基础。本文据此指出了未来经验研究需要解决的理论与方法问题。

The introduction of compulsory competitive tendering in UK local government reflected conventional public choice theories of bureaucracy. These theories suggest that competition for service contracts will lead to lower expenditure and higher efficiency. Extensions and criticisms of the classical public choice model yield very different conclusions. First, the problems of bureaucratic supply are less severe than originally assumed, and secondly competition may itself generate new problems such as transaction costs, erosion of trust between principals and agents, and rent seeking. The impact of competition on spending and efficiency is therefore indeterminate, and must be established empirically. However, studies which evaluate the effects of competitive tendering in local government are few in number, cover a limited range of services, and are methodologically flawed. Therefore neither the initial imposition of competitive tendering by the Conservatives, nor its planned abolition by Labour, can be traced to a solid foundation of theoretical or empirical support. Theoretical and methodological problems that need to be resolved by further empirical studies are identified.

竞争性招标的理论效应

THEORETICAL EFFECTS OF COMPETITIVE TENDERING

竞争是英国及其他国家新公共管理改革的核心手段，英国地方政府尤其受到强制性竞争性招标（CCT）的影响。工党政府计划以绩效指标和标杆管理构成的“最佳价值”制度取代CCT，这可能使部分服务重新回到地方政府内部的垄断供给。尽管围绕CCT 的研究数量庞大，既有文献大多关注合同在公共与私人生产者之间的分配，以及竞争对组织结构和过程的影响，对地方政府支出和效率的直接评估反而相对不足。由此，本文在制度转向发生之前重新审视竞争性招标的理论依据，以及它对地方政府支出和效率的实际影响。

经典公共选择理论将自利视为官员行为的基本动机，认为竞争可以打破官僚机构对服务供给的垄断，使政治委托人能够比较不同供应者的价格，从而把权力从官僚转回政治决策者。这里的关键不是生产者属于公共部门还是私人部门，而是市场中是否存在竞争。该理论据此提出两项预期：受到竞争的具体服务支出会下降，单位产出的成本会降低，技术效率因而提高。不过，节省下来的资金可能在地方政府总预算内重新分配，竞争也不会自动提升服务对公众偏好和需求的回应程度，因此它并不必然改善配置效率。

对经典模型的批评使这一结论变得不确定。官僚可能追求的是可自由支配预算、核心预算或机构塑造，而非简单地最大化总预算；政治控制和既有市场压力也会限制官僚扩张。更重要的是，市场并非没有成本：起草合同、监督绩效和约束承包商会产生交易成本；当资产专用性高、承包商的机会主义动机强、潜在外部供应者较少或未来服务需求不确定时，内部层级生产反而可能更有效率。服务质量的信息不对称可能诱使承包商降低质量；正式合同和密集监督可能侵蚀信任，使人员只完成合同明确规定的工作；投标者为争取暂时垄断地位而投入资源，还会形成反复发生的寻租成本。竞争由此既可能减少原有的官僚低效，也可能增加新的支出与低效，其净效应只能由经验证据判断。

Competition was central to new public management reforms in the United Kingdom and elsewhere, with UK local government particularly affected by compulsory competitive tendering (CCT). The Labour government planned to replace CCT with a Best Value regime based on performance indicators and benchmarking, potentially allowing some services to return to monopolistic in-house provision. Despite a large literature on CCT, most existing work concentrates on how contracts are distributed between public and private producers or on competition's effects on organizational structures and processes; its effects on local authority spending and efficiency have received comparatively little direct evaluation. This institutional shift made it necessary to reassess both the theoretical rationale for tendering and its actual effects on local spending and efficiency.

Classical public choice theory treats self-interest as a basic motive of public officials. Competition is expected to break bureaucratic monopolies and allow political sponsors to compare suppliers' prices, shifting power from bureaucrats back to political decision makers. The crucial factor is competition rather than whether production is public or private. Two expectations follow: spending should fall in the services directly exposed to competition, and lower unit costs should raise technical efficiency. Yet savings may simply be reallocated within the local authority budget, and tendering does not necessarily make services more responsive to public preferences and needs. It therefore has no necessary effect on allocative efficiency.

Critiques of the classical model make the overall prediction indeterminate. Bureaucrats may seek discretionary or core budgets, or shape their organizations, rather than simply maximize total budgets; political control and existing market pressures also constrain bureaucratic expansion. More importantly, markets introduce their own costs. Writing contracts, monitoring performance, and controlling contractors create transaction costs; internal hierarchical production may be more efficient when asset specificity is high, contractors have strong incentives to act opportunistically, few external suppliers are available, or future service requirements are uncertain. Information asymmetries over service quality may encourage contractors to reduce quality; formal contracting and intensive monitoring may erode trust and induce staff to do only what the contract specifies; and bidders expend resources in recurring rent-seeking efforts to secure temporary monopolies. Competition may therefore reduce old bureaucratic inefficiencies while creating new expenditure and inefficiency, so its net effect must be determined empirically.

竞争性招标的影响：证据评估

THE IMPACT OF COMPETITIVE TENDERING:

AN EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE

本文评估了英国地方政府竞争性招标的9 项学术研究，其中4 项研究自愿性竞争性招标，5 项研究强制性竞争性招标。表面上看，结果非常一致：所有研究都发现竞争与支出下降相关；5 项研究发现服务质量没有变化，1 项发现质量改善；总体上有6 项研究支持效率提高。另有2 项研究同时发现支出和质量下降，但由于二者下降幅度无法比较，效率变化并不明确。没有研究直接显示竞争导致支出增加或效率下降，因此这些结果乍看之下支持经典公共选择理论和保守党推行CCT 的政策。

但这种一致性建立在十分稀疏的证据之上。6 项支持效率提升的研究中有4 项只分析垃圾收集，唯一涵盖法定8 类CCT 服务的研究显示，垃圾收集的平均成本下降11.3%，街道清洁和教育与福利餐饮的平均成本却分别上升2.6% 和2.8%；街道清洁的单项合同变化范围更从下降31% 到上升63%。研究样本从1 个地方政府到367 个不等，许多小样本研究没有显著性检验，关键问题的有效答复数量还常常低于名义样本量。例如，一项调查名义上获得37 个地方政府的答复，但只有14 个提供节支信息，只有7 个回答交易成本问题。因此，以垃圾收集为主的结果可能高估了平均节支，并掩盖竞争在部分地区造成额外财政负担的事实。

现有研究的测量和设计也不足以支持强结论。支出指标通常只计算直接服务成本，几乎不纳入交易成本，从未衡量寻租造成的资源转移，也常以招标价格而非最终实际成本衡量节支；裁员引起的社会保障支出等外部成本则可能把地方节省转化为国家层面的负担。质量往往由合同事前规定的标准或服务管理者的判断代理，既不能证明合同实施后的实际质量，也忽略消费者等其他利益相关者和未写入合同的服务内容；垃圾收集研究通常只使用两个质量指标，而审计委员会还识别出另外八个维度。9 项研究中有5 项仅进行双变量比较，未排除既有效率趋势、财政压力、绩效指标、服务需求、财政资源和政党控制等因素。例如，垃圾收集单位成本在CCT 引入前的1979 至1984 年间已经下降25%，后续改善不能自然归因于CCT。即使部分研究采用多变量模型，遗漏变量仍可能使竞争效应的估计产生偏差。

The article evaluates nine academic studies of competitive tendering in UK local government: four on voluntary tendering and five on compulsory tendering. On the surface, the results are highly consistent. Every study associates competition with lower expenditure; five report no change in service quality and one reports improvement; six studies broadly support higher efficiency. Two studies find both lower spending and lower quality, but the relative size of those changes is unknown, so the efficiency effect is unclear. None directly finds higher spending or lower efficiency. Taken at face value, the evidence appears to support classical public choice theory and the Conservative policy of imposing CCT.

This apparent consistency rests on sparse evidence. Four of the six studies supporting higher efficiency examine refuse collection alone. The only study covering all eight statutory CCT services reports an average cost reduction of 11.3 percent in refuse collection, but average increases of 2.6 percent in street cleaning and 2.8 percent in education and welfare catering; individual street-cleaning contracts range from a 31 percent decrease to a 63 percent increase. Sample sizes range from one local authority to 367, many small-sample studies do not test statistical significance, and the number of usable responses to key questions is often below the stated sample size. In one survey, 37 councils responded overall, but only 14 provided information on savings and only seven answered the question on transaction costs. The emphasis on refuse collection may therefore overstate average savings and conceal additional financial burdens in some localities.

Measurement and research design problems further weaken the conclusions. Expenditure measures usually capture only direct service costs, rarely include transaction costs, never measure resources diverted to rent seeking, and sometimes compare pre-tender spending with a bid price rather than realized costs. External costs, such as national social security spending following local job losses, can also turn local savings into wider public burdens. Quality is often represented by ex ante contract specifications or service managers' judgments, which neither establish achieved quality nor reflect other stakeholders and informal service elements omitted from contracts; refuse-collection studies commonly use only two quality indicators even though the Audit Commission identified eight additional dimensions. Five of the nine studies use simple bivariate comparisons and do not rule out prior efficiency trends, fiscal pressure, performance indicators, service needs, financial resources, or party control. Refuse-collection unit costs had already fallen by 25 percent between 1979 and 1984, before CCT was introduced, so later improvements cannot automatically be attributed to CCT. Even some multivariate studies omit important variables, leaving their estimates of competition vulnerable to bias.

是的

最佳价值与竞争性招标评估

BEST VALUE AND THE ASSESSMENT OF COMPETITIVE TENDERING

竞争性招标在“最佳价值”制度中的确切地位并不清楚。工党的政策一方面承诺取消普遍性的强制招标，另一方面又把竞争保留为管理工具、最佳价值检验和绩效计划的重要组成部分。取消“强制”可能由中央政府劝导和地方审计压力取代，也会使地方服务供给安排更加多样：一些地方政府可能继续进行市场测试，另一些则更多依赖标杆管理和同类地方政府之间的绩效比较。这种差异既为分析竞争性招标的后果提供条件，也使研究者能够考察地方政府为何选择不同的生产方式。

未来研究首先需要比较竞争性招标与公共机构垄断供给的相对优劣。为此，应采用有效且全面的支出和质量指标，计入交易成本、信任成本和寻租成本，并在统计模型中控制影响地方支出与效率的其他因素。研究还必须区分“可竞争性”与实际“竞争”：前者只是决定向外部供应者征集投标，后者则意味着真正收到多个替代性投标。自愿招标的选择本身也不能只用技术效率解释，财政压力、选民与利益集团偏好、市政雇员的力量以及地方政治家的意识形态都可能影响地方政府是否外包服务。

其次，竞争性招标的影响不会在所有服务和地区中保持不变。越接近“纯粹官僚机构”的公共生产者（垄断某项服务、完全依赖政治委托人供资且缺少付费用户），越可能受到竞争的强烈影响；已经面对私人供应者或依赖使用者付费的机构，受市场测试的影响可能较小。服务市场以外的竞争同样重要：政党间的选举竞争以及地方政府间对经济发展和财政资源的竞争，可能已经约束了官僚行为。若这些竞争很强，外部投标的增量效应可能很小；若它们很弱，竞争性招标的作用可能更大。未来模型因此应纳入生产者的市场权力、收入来源、政党竞争强度和地方政府间竞争程度。

The exact place of competitive tendering in the Best Value regime was unclear. Labour policy promised to remove the general requirement to tender while retaining competition as a management tool, a test of Best Value, and a component of performance plans. Central-government exhortation and local audit pressure could replace compulsion, producing greater diversity in service-delivery arrangements. Some councils might continue market testing, while others could rely more on benchmarking and comparisons with similar authorities. This variation would make it possible to examine both the consequences of tendering and the local conditions that lead councils to choose different production arrangements.

Future research must first compare the relative merits of competitive tendering and monopoly supply by public agencies. This requires valid, comprehensive measures of expenditure and quality, explicit treatment of transaction, trust, and rent-seeking costs, and statistical controls for other influences on local spending and efficiency. Studies must also distinguish contestability, the decision to seek external tenders, from actual competition, the receipt of alternative bids. Voluntary tendering choices cannot be explained by technical efficiency alone; fiscal pressure, constituent and pressure-group preferences, municipal employee power, and the ideology of local politicians may also shape whether councils contract out services.

Second, the effects of tendering are unlikely to be constant across services and places. A public producer that closely resembles a pure bureau, monopolizing a service, relying entirely on a political sponsor, and receiving little direct revenue from users, should be more strongly affected by competition. Organizations already facing private suppliers or relying on user fees may respond less to market testing. Competition outside the service market also matters. Electoral competition between parties and rivalry among local authorities for development and financial resources may already constrain bureaucratic behaviour. Where these pressures are strong, external bids may add little; where they are weak, tendering may matter more. Future models should therefore include producer market power, revenue sources, party competition, and inter-authority rivalry.

结论

CONCLUSION

经典公共选择理论认为，自利动机与官僚垄断会造成公共服务供给过度和低效率，竞争则通过揭示替代性价格、削弱垄断权力而降低支出并提高效率。但官僚并不一定单纯追求更大的总预算，其行为还受到政治和市场力量约束；竞争同时可能增加交易成本、信任成本与寻租成本。因此，自利、合同和竞争的结合也可能造成支出过度与低效率，理论本身无法为支持或反对CCT 提供明确结论。

判断竞争性招标的效果必须依赖经验研究，而英国地方政府的现有证据数量有限、服务覆盖狭窄且方法存在缺陷。支出和质量指标未能充分对应理论概念，多数研究也没有控制其他影响因素。更全面、准确的证据既能帮助中央政府确定“最佳价值”制度中竞争应占的位置，也能帮助地方政府选择符合自身条件和目标的服务生产方式。在此之前，无论最初强制推行CCT，还是随后计划废除CCT，都不能说建立在坚实的理论或经验证据基础之上。

Classical public choice theory argues that self-interest and bureaucratic monopoly produce oversupply and inefficiency, while competition lowers spending and raises efficiency by revealing alternative prices and weakening monopoly power. Yet bureaucrats do not necessarily seek only larger total budgets, and political and market forces constrain their behaviour. Competition can also add transaction, trust, and rent-seeking costs. A combination of self-interest, contracts, and competition may therefore produce excessive expenditure and inefficiency, leaving theory without a clear verdict for or against CCT.

The effects of competitive tendering must consequently be judged through empirical research, but the available evidence from UK local government is limited, narrow in service coverage, and methodologically weak. Measures of expenditure and quality do not adequately represent the theoretical concepts, and most studies fail to control for other influences. More comprehensive and accurate evidence could help central government determine the place of competition within Best Value and help councils choose production arrangements suited to their circumstances and objectives. Until then, neither the original imposition of CCT nor its planned abolition can be said to rest on a solid theoretical or empirical foundation.